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 … phenomenon … time and space … basic con-
dition. If something in those fundaments goes wrong,¶ then
we are in a very critical status and that is what I wanted
to leap up to. Now, in our next discussion hour we will go
on to look nearer at this funny change that has occurred as
to time. Perhaps there is one also as to space. Perhaps
we can find that all the symptoms we have up to now developed
are related to those fundamental factors, those fundamental
changes in our modern life. As we have already found that
boredom has something to do with waiting, now let’s next
time see what isolation might have to do with, and what
isolation or loneliness really is. First something funny
happened to time, to our relation to time. We keep that in
mind for the next discussion hour. We go now into the other,
into space.
 We have seen that in order to inquire into the condi-
tions and capabilities of man we needed a certain historical
background. We looked at certain major stages of the so-
called development of the human mind and found that this age
between 1000 and the year one in history is a very curious
age, an age that in a way resembles the one we are entering,
an age of absolute uncertainty to put it negatively, where
new positions had to be taken. We choose all the great
thinkers we will consider here in this course out of this
age with the purpose of asking them because of the suspicion
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that they might know better. They have lived, in an age
that was an age of continuous change and transformation.
They were forced to take new positions and by taking new
positions they might be able to show us what a human being
can do in taking position, how that comes about, how he can,
so to speak, make up his mind afresh. We have that back-
ground now; but we have to see more before we are finished.
How has this whole line of inquiry come about.
 I first want to tell you that this work of Karl Jas-
pers, »Origin and Aim of History«, is now translated into Eng-
lish.1 This book is valuable and I recommend it to everybody
because of the first few chapters of the book where he tries
to give a certain resume of the work of that age with every-
thing else we know in history; and you might get additional
help there because we cannot go too deeply into the histori-
cal side here. But the work itself indicates that we have
become conscious about history out of a bitter need.
 So for instance with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche who
were the first to become suspicious of what they called the
one-sidedness of the Western tradition. They thought all
the traditional thought from Plato up to Hegel failed to give
us the possibilities to gain insight into our own modern
situation. So they got suspicious and thought there must
be a one-sidedness, a limit to that kind of thinking, they
and their friends and followers up to Heidegger — always
only a few philosophers, the so-called existentialists.
1 Jaspers, Karl: The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by 
Michael Bullock. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953.
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The others, the positivists, tried to become scientists and
failed. They have developed philosophy into a kind of high-
er science and they flatter themselves that it has now be-
come a wonderful science, the central science, so to speak.
But unfortunately when they teach a scientist this symbolic
logic and all those scientific so-called philosophical propo-
sitions and the scientist agrees and studies them, the out-
come is usually that then the scientist says, ›My God, why
did I have to learn all those banalities, those things which
I did instinctively anyhow all along?‹ So they failed,
and the others who tried to reintroduce us to the supernatur-
alistic thought of Thomas Aquinas failed in a way, too, be-
cause if we study that then we say, ›Why didn’t we study
Thomas Aquinas in the first place? What do we need the
neo-Thomists for, because if we want to believe the assump-
tions that Plato and Aquinas and Augustine made — namely,
the assumption there is an absolute —then let’s go to the
great masters. Why do we have to listen to the neo-Thomists
of Chicago if we can read Thomas himself?‹
 But those lonely figures who later have been called
the existentialists though that is a name that does not
really cover them — let’s say the activistic thinkers, and
those are thinkers like Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, and
Nietzsche, then Bergson, and later the so-called existen-
tialists, Camus, Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers — took upon
themselves the blame that they were not scientific, did not
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live up to their age because they wanted to find the one-
sidedness of this Western metaphysical tradition that now
has broken down. That led them far afield — them and their
followers, those historical scientists who got interested
in the question, too — and we have a development of thought
in the direction, first, of stressing the importance of
Socratic thinkers. They tried to go back behind Socrates and
later they found out that Socrates himself is a pre-Socratic
thinker and that they would have to say pre-Platonic think-
ers. Now the pre-Platonic thinkers must be the important
ones. Then comes another stream — namely, people like
[Paul Deussen], the friend of Nietzsche who introduced Indian
philosophy to Germany and the Englishmen, who introduced this
to England. We started to study Japanese and Indian philo-
sophies, Japanese Zen-Buddhism and we found that we here
had a means to check the one-sidedness of the Western meta-
physical thought. Now, as you will see the figures we are
taking up here are taken all out of this context: Lao-tze,
a Chinese philosopher; Buddha, an Indian philosopher; two,
so to speak, Hebrew philosophers; and the others Greek phi-
losophers — all, so to speak, pre-Platonic, all belonging
to that age which was non-metaphysical, for which the dis-
tinction between body and spirit had not yet been made, and
an age when people thought not in terms of the hereafter or
in terms of a religious eternity but in terms of a possible
philosophic eternity. That was one of the reasons why we
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all, I mean the modern philosophers, tried to leave out
the contemplation of the philosophers from Plato until Hegel.
There was another reason and that reason is contempla-
tion itself. They all are not only metaphysical but con-
templative thinkers. This whole age of contemplation came
to an end when [Hegel] finally thought that he, by the
means of philosophy, had really proved the existence of
God, and discovered God, so to speak. And Schelling told
him later:
›If you have discovered God as an idea what do I 
do with that? All that has no practical, no active 
use. You philosophers are people who live from the 
activity of others and keep out of activity your- 
selves. You are nothing but the modern priests. 
You do not really live an active creative life of 
man any more. You have gone out of it by con- 
templation. You have placed yourself above man.‹
That is when he coined the term existential. Schelling
said, ›Let’s have an existential view.‹ That means let’s
have again a view that has a relation to man’s life, ideas
by which he can live, ideas that are really the expression
of his situation in the world and not ideas that come about
by speculative logic developed out of mere contemplation
of life.
 So we have become very harsh judges of this contem-
plation. Yet we must also see what contemplation meant.
Without this contemplation there could be no development of
Western culture, no development of humanity. This basic
idea that the spirit is higher than the body reigned and
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governed humanity for centuries and only by that was it
possible to develop thinking so much that we finally reached
an original position. We owe that fact to that development.
This criticism we have now is exactly the positive result
of that development. The negative side of that development
is the incredible credulity of the modern masses which still
are ready to believe almost everything from the wonder soap
to Hitler or to Stalin or to anybody else because they have
been trained so long by the contemplative thinkers and ser-
vility. But the positive side is what Nietzsche stated when
he said,
›Well now I have gotten rid of almost everything 
critically that Christianity ever provided and 
I have found that the only virtue a modern 
philosopher has and should have absolutely is 
absolute sincerity — but where do I have it 
from? From this tremendous development of 
Christian morals. So I myself owe my position 
to Christian morals.‹2
He really did not trust himself around the corner. He knew
always that one has to be critical of one’s own position
so he made that statement, too. So did Kierkegaard. Criti-
cal philosophy has been made possible by Kant. Kant did
something he did not want to do, but it worked completely.
The German poet Heinrich Heine, a German Jew who was both
a Jew and a German and, more than both, the first good Euro-
pean and that is why Nietzsche loved him so much as the
figure of the first good European. He said once, »Robes-
pierre and Kant, those were two dry souls born to measure
2 Reference unclear.
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beans(?) in a grocery store for people but fate put in the
scale of one a king and in the scale of the other God and
they gave the right measure.«3
 Yes, Kant did not want to do what he did. He wanted
only to find whether metaphysics is really possible, can
metaphysics claim to be a science; and by studying that
proposition he found, though he himself did not want to
believe in what he found, that metaphysics is impossible,
that metaphysical thinking, in a way, cannot be allowed any
more because it is based on general assumptions which have
to be accepted on belief. If they are not accepted on be-
lief but are looked into critically, then every one of those
assumptions can be replaced by the exact opposite of that
assumption which will be as true. That means both are not
true. The human mind runs into hopeless antinomies, contra-
dictions as to those metaphysics as a science or as a relia-
ble human pursuit could only be erected. Well, Kant gave
the right measure as to God because he found what we call
the agnostic view, namely, that we, by reason, cannot know
if God exists and also cannot know if God does not exist.
He finally came to the limit of human reason and as soon as
he had done that, the melancholic Kierkegaard in Denmark
went in his doctor’s dissertation back to Socrates and wrote
about the concept of irony in Socrates4 and he was the first
who had a dim awareness of what we know now after a long
3 Heine, Heinrich: On the History of Religion and Philosophy in 
Germany, 1834.
4 Kierkegaard, Søren: On the Concept of Irony with Continual  
Reference to Socrates, 1841.
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labor of inquiry back into the Socratic position itself,
trying with the help of the philologists and the philosophers
to find what is the difference between Socrates and Plato.
Was Socrates a Platonist or was Plato a Socratist? Neither
— they are, in a way, opposites. We had to unearth the
original thinking of Socrates out of the Platonic dialogues
by the conditions contained there to find what the different
positions might have been.
 We will look into that when we come to Socrates; but
one thing was at once sure as soon as we were able to unearth
those things: namely, that what Kant had done here is nothing
but a return to Socrates. That is what Socrates had started
with — to say let’s not talk about wisdom, we cannot have
it; let’s talk about human reason and its limits. Let’s
first find out what the limits of this reason are then we
might perhaps be able to use reason. If not we will become
the most unreasonable people in the world by misusing our
reason. So the critical philosophy was there already long
before Kant; it was only rediscovered without Kant’s own
knowledge, of course. He didn’t want all that; he wanted
only the truth, as a philosopher should. He wanted to know
whether it is really possible to build a system of speculative
thought and values and ideas that is coherent in itself,
namely a metaphysical system. And he found that no, it is
not possible because every such system has to be based on one
general assumption which has to be taken by belief. So it is
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out of the realm of philosophy. Then we can either say
philosophy could be the handmaid of theology and should be
that alone — if it is metaphysics. It should become aware
at least that it is based on belief just as religion is and
should not claim to be the independent performance of free
human reason if it is bound to a basic belief.
 Now the modern philosophers make the proposition to
say, ›Let’s first find out if that is necessarily so. Let’s
forget about metaphysics; let’s start afresh and find out
what can be found merely by human reason itself and perhaps
if we find that and operate absolutely critically perhaps
there is a possibility to get into a relation to eternity
(not God; about God we cannot know as philosophers), into
something like eternity by the means of reason, without
the help of belief, cult, or an established religion.‹ The
proposition amounts to the other proposition. Instead of
going back and trying to believe things which we now couldn’t
believe any more because we have once rejected them, instead
of becoming fakers we should try a new step in the enlighten-
ment and a step that is not so shallow but leads deeper and
is more profound. That means to risk the fight for the inner
freedom of man once more and not to give up or to give in,
not to fall for modern metaphysics, which is the worst one,
namely, pseudo-scientific metaphysics which likes to tell
us what we must do according to iron laws or the iron laws of
nature, making us automatons; not to fall back into some be-
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lief that makes us happy — namely, a belief in a higher
proposition of eternity or immortality in the religious way
because we would use this only to make ourselves happy. We
would use it for psychological motives, not for motives of
real belief; we would be fakers. So it seems only that the
third way is open, though it is the hardest way and this way
has to be gotten.
 Now, in the Greek world of Socrates’ time we have al-
ready a situation that seems strangely familiar. Socrates
was poisoned or killed by his fellow citizens because they
believed that he was somebody else. They almost could not
help to believe that [he] was somebody else, he was so easily
mixed up with a new trend of thinking which came up in his
time which was forced to use the logical means developed
by this trend of thinking, the Sophists. When he was judged
there seemed to be two positions that everybody knew in the
Greek world at that time. The first position was that one
obeys the gods, that the life of man is regulated by an ab-
solute, not revealed in the Hebrew or Christian sense, but
given by tradition in the Athenian laws, a tradition that
went back in belief to the gods. Athena herself had given
those laws to Athens. The education was based on this be-
lief and they did not know that this whole had become a fake,
that they had made out of the Polis of the community of Athens
not a democracy but an oligarchy (?), the rule of a few (?),
that Athens was going to decline and that all those old
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propositions had become a lie, an ambiguity. They wanted to
believe that they still held.
 And there were the others, the Sophists, who knew that
this could not hold and who did not believe in those proposi-
tions any more. And the greatest of them was Protagoras who
said, ›Man is the measure of all things. Of the being ones
that they are and of the non-being ones that they are not.‹5
›Man is the measure of all things. As to the gods, I do not
know if they exist or not.‹ This is the position of the
Sophists. This position sounds very much like Socrates’ as
to the gods. Socrates never claimed to know the gods; he
even showed, as Kant, that we possibly cannot know anything
about the gods. Yet he did not deny the gods. Protagoras,
and the other Sophists especially more than he, denied the
gods. Man is the measure of all things — this is the root
of humanism, of humanism as a metaphysics — because humanism
is a metaphysics. Humanism is something we have to look cri-
tically at, too. The root of humanism is in Protagoras. This
is, so to speak, the first flag of humanism that is raised,
and Protagoras was one of the greatest thinkers of Greek
times. If man is the measure of all things, who is man? Man
does not exist. All men are man; if man is the measure of all
things, then you and I, and you and you and I, we all for
ourselves, everybody for himself is the measure of all things.
That means we fall into an absolute relativism. The final de-
cision is made by the strongest one; it becomes a question of
5 Plato: Theaetetus, 152a.
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mere power. If we are all absolutes — man is the absolute,
that means we all are absolutes, everybody of us — if we
all are absolutes we will come into a ceaseless fight against
each other, we will use the wrong logic which is the logic
of not convincing another but making him concede, making
him give in. This logic will finally be replaced by the wea-
pons of terror because they are the best arguments of the wrong
logic, and one will govern or nobody will
govern. The multitude will govern in an apparatus. That is
the end of humanism. The start of humanism is the claim that
the absolute that is in the gods, as the old Greek system
said, can be replaced by the absolute resulting in man.
 So Socrates was in between. He did not think that
man was an absolute, nor did he make use of an absolute that
the gods were supposed to be because he said I do not know
about the gods so I cannot use them as an argument. He
must have had in view another relation to an absolute which
might be a relative relation of man to some absolute. His
student Plato really gave in to the enemies of Socrates be-
cause he later said against Protagoras, ›The measure of all
things is not man; the measure of all things is God.‹6 Now not
gods, but God. By that he did not mean Jehovah, the one God,
he meant divinity, the principle of divinity, the idea of
God. With that he placed himself against the Socratic posi-
tion because Socrates had never claimed such a thing — of
higher ideas, of Godly origin, that govern the life of man.
He was not a metaphysician.
6 »In our eyes God will be ›the measure of all things‹ in the 
highest degree—a degree much higher than is any “man” they talk 
of.«. Plato: Laws, IV, 716c.
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 So [we] have three positions here which are strangely
familiar. If we replace now the old Greek position with
the Platonic position because it is the sharper one and the
better one and has become one of the great foundations of
our Western culture, then we would have what we have today.
We have it only in a very diluted form — namely, on the
one hand, the proposition: nature is the measure of all
things and since man is, so to speak, the finest product
of nature, so man, of course, is the measure of all things
and he has only to follow his own nature and the laws of
his nature and the laws of nature and the laws of history
which he can discover. Being the absolute judge, he is the
measure; and that leads us straight into totalitarianism.
This what I call naturalism as a metaphysics; and we have
again super-naturalism as a metaphysics among those people
who come to us and say, ›Well, there is only one help for
it — back to Thomas Aquinas.‹ But Thomas Aquinas is Augus-
tine and is Aristotle and is Plato. They have the same basic
position. So we are back philosophically — not back, we
are still in the same predicament. We haven’t made any pro-
gress. If we cut through all those terms — and those posi-
tions have been termed naturalism and supernaturalism,
materialism and idealism, realism and romanticism, and what
have you, through the ages — it has always amounted to the
same thing, to the same basic proposition. So one group
believes in an absolute that is transcendent — God or ideas,
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eternal ideas — and then you might perhaps have a little
freedom, namely, the freedom of choice between good and evil.
Things will not go entirely worse, but this will set a limit
to reason which philosophers do not intend to set. We want
also to set a limit to reason, but we want to find out what
this limit is and not have this limit set, namely, being
told that in certain questions you just have to stop think-
ing and have to believe. We don’t want to bring reason as
a sacrifice, and every religion or every super-naturalistic
philosophy asks of us to bring reason as a sacrifice, to
sacrifice reason at a certain point. We don’t like that
proposition. The others ask the entire sacrifice of reason,
too, because they say there is no reason at all, there is
only intellect. You can be clever then, and that means you
can really look into the laws of nature and history and of
man, so to speak, who is the judge of all things and the
measure and can find them out and then you will have found
what you have to do, what you must do anyhow. That is the
freedom they propose to us. The one is not enough freedom;
the other is the opposite of freedom.
 Both propositions are not entirely satisfactory and
that is the reason why we try now to ask about people who
did not place themselves into that predicament, who have
not been in it; and the pre-Platonic thinkers in Greece, for
instance, we have to look critically into, also. There
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happened a terrible thing to Heidegger. He was one of the
best modern philosophers who understood that we have to go
back to pre-Platonic thinking, so he started to unearth, so
to speak, the sense of the archaic Greek language (he is one
of the greatest philologists as a side line, who lives). He
found the original meaning of things but he believed that all
pre-Platonic thinkers have been free of this metaphysical
condition of being either naturalistic or super-naturalistic. 
He believed in them, he started to interpret them — those
are all masterpieces of interpretation — and finally we
find he had helped again to develop metaphysics because he
has not become aware that all the so-called naturalistic
thinkers before Plato or before Socrates have also been
metaphysicians, namely, naturalistic metaphysicians and Plato
is only the opposite pole from them. There is only one
except Socrates who does not take a metaphysical position
and that is Heraclitus. So that is the reason why for this
course of the Greek thinkers only Heraclitus and Socrates
have been chosen, because they can give us their credentials:
they can show to us that they did not believe in any such
thing as the absolute nature or the absolute divinity. They
were neither naturalists nor super-naturalists — and they
were the only ones.
 So after this long process of seeing into that kind of
a past that has been forgotten, we finally have a point in
a few thinkers which we might be able to compare to our sit-
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uation and from whom we might he able to learn. This
account I have given to you in order to put you into the
picture as to the most modern developments and here you have
the connection. Since Kant’s great deed, namely, involun-
tarily to blow up this foundation of certainty that was un-
derlying all our speculative thinking in the West, since then
with Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, thinkers have come
who were again forced, and forced themselves, into a basic
condition of absolute uncertainty. Most of them failed
finally because they thought they could build now after
having been so critical of their own metaphysics. So Marx
fell into positivism and became a natural metaphysician of
the first order. Even Nietzsche slipped in his old age and
thought that in the will to power he had discovered the prin-
ciple, the absolute principle of being and now he had it and
now we have the truth in our hands and won’t let go and we
can bring everything by this absolute truth that we have in
our hands. He not only died in insanity, he died in illu-
sion. So did Marx, so did Kierkegaard. When Kierkegaard
started out to question everything again afresh, not believing
in those old assumptions and propositions, finally in his
despair he did not see any other help but to jump into
absolute belief and to say, ›There is nothing to reason
whatsoever. It only misleads man. There is only one help
and that is absolute belief in God.‹ God has become identi-
cal with nothingness. He asked us to believe in a God that
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is nothing, that is identical with nothingness. Falling
into nihilism and becoming a religious metaphysician in
the end was his fate. So everyone of the three great ones
that opened the new inquiry finally fell back into the old
predicament — so hard it is or seems to be to make steps
into an entirely new way thinking.
 Nietzsche started out by being anti-Plato. He wanted
to be it consciously — we see many anti-communists today
and the trouble with them seems to be that they are too much
communists, namely, in their methods. ›Anti‹ is no position.
If one does not know one’s pro and one remains ›anti‹, then
one falls into the trap of using the methods of the ›anti‹.
Anti-metaphysics is metaphysical too; anti-communism is
communism too. What we need to know is, what are you for
— not what are you against. The against you have to show
me from your ›what you are for‹, then I will believe what
you’re against and your ›anti‹ is productive. Otherwise it
can be entirely negative and even help the enemy. But
sometimes in times of emergency — these are all tragic
situations of life — one has to be that way and Nietzsche,
for instance, saw no help but in the line of anti-Platonism.
Finally he was a Platonist himself. But he had opened the
way and it was a heroic deed. He had consciously fought against
that position and had loosened it up tremendously and brought
forth new propositions that are for us very, very helpful.
 So all of the three great thinkers in the 19th Century,
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the three new great thinkers (Hegel might have been a greater
mind, but he was an old thinker, he was a metaphysician from
the beginning), those three are tragic figures. They all
finally met a fate position and knew it and really had dis-
covered nihilism. With them nihilism starts as a philoso-
phical position and we are all in that predicament. In the
next session when we go into this question, ›What has gone
wrong with our relation to time and to eternity?‹, then we
might find the connection to what nothingness in our time
means. And I do not mean nihilism as it is used today,
namely, people who want to destroy and so on, and all that
nonsense. I mean a philosophical proposition, the philosophi-
cal position formulated by Nietzsche, »Nothing is true, every-
thing is permitted.«7 That is the position of philosophical
nihilism. The statement that nothing is true and everything
is permitted because man cannot find any truth, therefore
nothing can be true — man is the measure of all things and
man cannot find any real law, therefore he cannot bind him-
self and everything is permitted — that is the underlying
conviction of most people of our time even when they claim
to be believers, or it is the practice they use, let alone
what they think. Most of the people of our time have been
driven into that nihilistic position. So we will look at
the people who formulated it and did not want to, because
the same Nietzsche who said that might be the case, could
also write about himself, ›Well, I have destroyed all founda-
7 Nietzsche, Friedrich: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1883-85, IV, § 
69; On the Genealogy of Morals, 1887, III, § 24.
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tions of morals because I have found no real true reason
for anything like morals. We do not have a leg to stand on.
We are ambiguous when we talk about morals because we do not
have any real reason for it. I have destroyed this founda-
tion. Everything is permitted — who is saying that? Me?
Could I commit a murder?‹ he writes, ›one little broken
promise of mine and long suffering and final death would be
my fate.‹8 That was what the man was — one of the great
moral personalities that ever lived, this critic of morals,
of the foundations of morals. He drove himself into that
absolute position that must drive him insane that he, being
born as a highly developed moral personality, nevertheless
as a philosopher could not find any moral reason that had
been put forward in all Western philosophy which he could
not finally show to be a conscious lie, brought up by a will
to power by certain intellectuals or priests. He demasks
them all as propositions of power over other men.
 So we take up the question: ›Is morals at all possi-
ble and what is morals?‹ ›Is there any foundation of ethics
or is there none if we leave God out?‹ As soon as we believe
in God everything is fine and this is all right, but if we
are merely in secular terms, then we have to show what and
where the foundation of it really is — and he tried and he
failed. Others have tried, others have failed because Camus,
one of the most serious modern philosophers, though he is a
very narrow man — he is not a great mind, but he is one of
8 References unclear.
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the most sincere and profound thinkers and most realistic —
he says, ›In all philosophy we have not yet been able to dis-
cover a reason why a man should not murder.‹9 Not a reason.
We live by instinct, we don’t do it — but there is no
reason to be found. If there is no reason that could prevent
us from murder and we do not go back to religion we might
be in for a fine time — and we are in for a fine time be-
cause as soon as we cannot find a reason, a real reason of
human reason against murder, then we will start to find in-
finite reasons for murder, infinite and fantastic reasons
in which lots of people will believe when we tell them those
reasons, and Hitler told them why he slaughtered five million
Jews and he did find a great part of humanity, and not only in
Germany, who believed those reasons, that they had to be li-
quidated. There is this credulity and we start to believe
in reasons brought forward why this group has to be wiped
out, or that group has to be wiped out — there are good
reasons for it.
 As soon as the foundation reason against murder —
namely, »Thou shalt not kill,« is not there any more because
God is gone, who gave that as a command-look how we perform.
We are compelled to find by human reason a fundament for not
murdering that everybody can understand, that can be an ar-
gument that nobody can refute by his own reason. That we have
not yet found, as Camus said and as Nietzsche said before him.
9 Most likely referring to Camus, Albert: The Rebel, 1951.
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That is one of our purposes, too, here because if we do not
find that human reason, limited as it might be, is able to
conduct the behavior of free men, then we better throw hu-
man reason overboard and go back into religious belief —
and in a hurry — because otherwise we will find ourselves
murdering each other in a short time all over the world be-
cause the reasons for murder grow, and they become more and
more convincing. That is the main danger of our time.
 So we have bitten off a big thing when in the enlighten-
ment of the 18th Century we claimed that man can now take
care of himself by human reason. Can we? So we have to ask
the question again: ›Can we? What is human reason? Who is
man? How does it reach with its limits? What can it do?
What can it not do?‹ So we will re-open the discussion with
the theologians and religious people, as well as with those
positivists and naturalists again. Either we find another
position or we have to give in.
¶ ¶ [Audio file 
ends here.]
